Diplomatic mythology on Iraq

President still peddling Saddam disarmament

While reading through the President's speech from Friday March 10, cited in the last post, I note that he is still promoting the obviously false notion that Saddam Hussein failed to ``disarm'' in late 2002 and early 2003.

PRESIDENT BUSH (Mar. 10, 2006): First choice of any president ought to be to deal with issues diplomatically. And we dealt with the issue of Iraq diplomatically: Security Council resolution after Security Council resolution after Security Council resolution, until 1441, when the world spoke with a united voice that said to Iraq, "Disarm, disclose or face serious consequences."

Saddam Hussein chose otherwise. He was removed from power. And there's no doubt in my mind that the United States is more secure and the world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power.

But Saddam Hussein clearly told the truth in Iraq's December 2002 declaration on weapons of mass destruction--Iraq had none. All subsequent pre-war hype on the subject from the president, Colin Powell, and other officials was hyperbolic pure crap. The president's second hand-picked inspector threw in the towel in December 2004.

More recently, it has been reported that President Bush knew as early as January 2003 that Iraq was void of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, in a January 31, 2003 White House meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush proposed flying US spy planes painted with UN colors over Iraq in order to provoke war. Bush reportedly told Blair that the ``diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning''. The case for war over WMD was non-existent and other rationale were sought.

In the end, the British Parliament authorized military action in Iraq on a bizarre legal theory concerning the post-Gulf-War resolution from 1991, in the absence of genuine authority from the UN Security Council. Contrary to the word of President Bush, UNSCR 1441 did not confer automatic authority for war without further Security Council action. All members' comments at the time on UNSCR 1441, save for some ludicrous unilateralism from then US Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte, ``welcomed the lack of `automaticity' in the final resolution.''

Of course, there is a good reason President Bush promulgates this mythology--it may one day become his post-office defense in a war crimes trial, against the charge of the supreme crime of Aggression.